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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Although legal rules and standards are used to achieve the same social goal, 
they differ significantly in approach. Ex ante, rules and standards are intended 
to inform actors of the legal consequences of their planned actions; in the event 
of a subsequent legal challenge, the applicable rule or standard is compared to 
the action taken to determine compliance. A rule defines the specific conduct or 
facts that trigger legal consequences, thus focusing attention—both before and 
after the fact—on the specified conduct or facts stated in the rule. In contrast, a 
standard describes the general goal to be achieved, but allows the 
decisionmaker to determine whether planned or actual conduct meets the 
relevant standard. For example, a posted speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour 
is a rule, whereas a statute that simply commands drivers not to exceed a 
“reasonable” speed is a standard. 
The relative merits of rules versus standards in lawmaking has been 
extensively debated both generally and with regard to specific areas of the law, 
but largely ignored with reference to corporation law.1 The reason is that 
corporation statutes have traditionally either been silent or relied almost 
exclusively on general standards in expressing substantive legal rights and 
obligations. The result has been that the legislature has ceded to the courts 
virtually all responsibility for many basic aspects of corporate governance to be 
developed on a case-by-case basis based upon general standards borrowed from 
agency law and equity or, less often, found to be implicit in the corporation 
statute. 
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 1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 
(1992); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257 (1974); Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards and the Battle of the Forms: 
A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982). A classic example from torts is the dispute 
between Justices Holmes and Cardozo in defining due care of a driver approaching an unguarded 
railroad crossing. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927) (Holmes, 
J.) (driver should stop and look), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 102–03 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) 
(driver should act with reasonable caution). 
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II 
THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT APPROACH 
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) broke this mold in 1988 by 
adopting chapter 8, subchapter F (“subchapter F”) dealing with the validity of 
contracts or transactions between directors and the corporation.2 Although 
other state statutes, including the immediate predecessor to subchapter F,3 
purported to provide a mechanism for sanitizing the contract or transaction,4 
the effect of following the prescribed procedures was not entirely clear. In part, 
this was because the statutes invariably undercut themselves by providing that 
the transaction or contract would not be void or voidable “solely” because of 
the director’s conflict if it were approved after full disclosure by disinterested 
directors or shareholders or was found to be “fair.” But what issues were left 
open by the use of “solely”? Presumably, when a court was satisfied the 
contract or transaction was “fair” by its standards, the only remaining 
justiciable issues would have been other challenges to enforceability that were 
unrelated to the conflicted interest, such as the statute of frauds or statute of 
limitations. But when the disinterested directors or shareholders approved, was 
the “fairness” of the contract or transaction still open for judicial review? The 
statutes did not foreclose that possibility and were phrased in the same broad 
terms courts had used to review conflict transactions before the statues were 
enacted.5 Breadth of expression is characteristic of a standard, rather than a 
rule, and invites similarly broad judicial discretion in deciding which facts and 
circumstances are relevant. Accordingly, some courts decided that disinterested 
director approval merely shifted the burden of proving fairness from the 
defendant to the plaintiff,6 and at least one court required the director to prove 
fairness notwithstanding disinterested director approval precisely because the 
statute was so close to the common law.7 And it was not until recently that the 
Delaware Supreme Court clearly held that approval of a conflict by informed, 
disinterested directors is entitled to business judgment protection.8 
Section 8.61 of the MBCA leaves no doubt regarding the effect of following 
the prescribed procedures: The conflicted-interest transaction “may not be the 
 
 2. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–8.63 (2008). 
 3. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1984). 
 4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2010). 
 5. Harold Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 39–43, 46–48 (1966). 
 6. E.g., Rivercity v. Am. Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908, 922 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d, 753 F.2d 1300 (5th 
Cir. 1985); Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 740 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 7. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib. Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 451–53 (Iowa 
1988). 
 8. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120–21 (Del. 2006). Previously, the 
effect of section 144 was unclear because of the Delaware courts’ insistence on a full entire fairness 
review whenever the conflicted director either was or represented a controlling shareholder. See 
generally Charles Hansen, “Benehana of Tokyo v. Benehana, Inc.”: Does This Represent Final Closure 
in the Delaware Law of Conflicts?, 80 Corporation (Aspen) ¶ 2.1 (Jan. 1, 2009). See infra part II(B) for 
the MBCA’s solution in the case of a conflicted-interest merger or disposition of assets. 
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subject of equitable relief, or give rise to an award of damages or other 
sanctions against [the conflicted] director.”9 Although section 8.61 provides for 
the usual three alternatives for curing the conflict, the fairness criterion plays a 
much more limited role than in the more traditional statutes. In the first place, 
the concept of fairness in subchapter F includes both fair dealing and fair price.10 
Since it would be virtually impossible for a director who intentionally concealed 
the existence of a conflict to establish “fair dealing,” subchapter F attaches a 
premium to board or shareholder disclosure, and thereby avoids the perverse 
incentive for a director to withhold information concerning a conflicted interest 
and take his or her chances at proving fairness if later caught. More important, 
if director or shareholder action is taken, a plaintiff attacking the transaction 
has the burden of proving that the specified procedures required to approve the 
conflict were not followed, since those are the only grounds on which the 
transaction can be challenged.11 The indeterminate fairness standard thus 
becomes an issue only if the conflict was not disclosed to and approved by the 
directors or the shareholders. 
Subchapter F also seeks to increase predictability and limit the number of 
litigable issues by providing rule-like definitions of relevant terms, including 
(1) what constitutes a “director’s conflicting interest transaction,” (2) the 
familial or economic relations that will cause another’s conflict to be attributed 
to the director, (3) the scope of required disclosure, and (4) the attributes that 
must be possessed by those directors who approve a conflicted-interest 
transaction.12 These attributes are captured in the concept of “qualified 
director,” a defined term that is applicable to a conflicted-interest transaction, 
as well as to the dismissal of a derivative action, authorization of 
indemnification or advance of expenses, and waiver by the corporation of a 
business opportunity presented to the board.13 
The MBCA also seeks to limit the number of issues involved in derivative 
proceedings. The most notable feature is the MBCA’s elimination of the 
demand-required or demand-excused inquiry in favor of a universal demand 
requirement.14 Once a derivative proceeding is commenced, the corporation 
may seek to have it dismissed if continuing the proceeding is not in the 
corporation’s interest. This determination may be made by (1) a majority of 
qualified directors if qualified directors constitute a quorum of the board; (2) a 
majority of a committee of two or more qualified directors appointed by a 
majority vote of qualified directors, even if not a quorum; or (3) a panel of one 
 
 9. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61(b) (2008). 
 10. Id. § 8.60(6). 
 11. Id. § 8.31(a)(1). 
 12. Id. §§ 8.60, 8.62. 
 13. Id. § 1.43. 
 14. Id. § 7.42. See generally Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in 
Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503 
(1989) (discussing limitations to this inquiry). 
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or more individuals appointed by the court.15 Section 7.44 retains the underlying 
policy of the demand-required or demand-excused distinction in focusing on the 
disinterestedness of the decisionmaking body at the time of the relevant 
decision—that is, under traditional law, whether the action has been properly 
commenced or, under the MBCA, whether it should be dismissed. The 
corporation has the burden of proof only when dismissal is sought by a 
committee of qualified directors whenever qualified directors do not constitute 
a majority of the board; the plaintiff has the burden of proof when the board 
consists of a majority of qualified directors or if dismissal is sought by a court-
appointed panel.16 In either event, the only facts that can be litigated are those 
relating to the moving party’s investigation. The court is not invited to revisit 
the conclusion reached by the investigating panel so long as that conclusion has 
some basis in its investigation.17 
A.  Use of Standards in the MBCA 
The director’s fiduciary duties of care and loyalty are classic examples of 
standards: They are open-ended and given content only by a court’s assessment 
of the facts of a specific case. Many corporation statutes, including an earlier 
version of section 8.30 of the MBCA, appear to define the duty of care in terms 
of ordinary negligence.18 Given the relatively few reported decisions wherein 
directors have actually been held liable for negligence, it is apparent that a 
disconnect exists between the duty of care as articulated and as actually applied. 
Delaware courts have implicitly recognized this by erecting the business 
judgment rule to screen complaints of care violations; violations are limited to 
those complaints alleging facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the 
board’s decision was affected by its self-interest or grossly negligent processes. 
Other courts have referred to the statutory duty of care as their state’s version 
of the business judgment rule.19 Although there are too few cases to support any 
firm conclusion, decisions of courts in these states do not appear to depart 
radically from Delaware law. Nevertheless, the failure to recognize the 
difference between articulation and application of the duty of care is bound to 
diminish predictability and perhaps encourage the bringing of lawsuits of 
doubtful or marginal merit. 
Innovative amendments to the MBCA in 1998 eliminate any possible 
confusion and enhance predictability by explicitly distinguishing between 
standards of director conduct in section 8.30 and standards of director liability 
 
 15. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.44(a)–(b), (e) (2008). 
 16. Id. § 7.44(d). 
 17. Id. § 7.44(a) & cmt. 2. 
 18. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984). Forty-one states have similar statutory provisions. 2 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 at 8-209 (4th ed. & 2009 Supp.); see also Michael P. Dooley, Two 
Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 482 (1992). 
 19. See, e.g., Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Lindner 
Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 624 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 1993). 
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in section 8.31. The standards of conduct set forth in section 8.30 are intended 
as guides for behavior and as points of reference for evaluating a director’s 
conduct, but violations of these standards do not carry direct liability 
consequences.20 Section 8.31 lists the grounds for imposing liability on directors, 
which, although denominated as standards, more closely resemble rules. Thus, 
liability may be imposed for a decision if the director “was not informed to an 
extent that the director reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances,” 
or if the decision was improperly motivated by outside influences, and the 
director is unable to establish that he or she reasonably believed the decision 
was also in the best interests of the corporation.21 Losses resulting from an 
alleged failure of the director’s oversight will result in liability only when there 
was a “sustained failure” to devote attention to oversight, or when the director 
was on inquiry notice and failed to take appropriate action.22 Liability may also 
result if the director’s actions were “not in good faith” or were not reasonably 
believed by the director to be in the best interests of the corporation.23 While 
these two grounds are expressed as standards, they describe fairly extreme 
behavior that is not often likely to occur.24 Section 8.31 also clarifies that the 
plaintiff has the burden of proof of establishing a breach of the duty of care, 
damages, and causation; however, the section preserves existing state 
allocations of the burden of proof when fairness is an issue.25 By more clearly 
identifying the issues that are relevant in liability claims against directors, 
section 8.31 significantly narrows the scope of judicial discretion and provides 
both greater assurance and more guidance to directors in discharging their 
duties. 
 
 20. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-34 (2008). 
 21. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)(2)(ii)(B), (iii)(B) (2008). 
 22. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(iv). 
 23. Id. § 8.31(a)(2)(i)–(ii)(A). 
 24. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the Delaware courts’ struggle with and 
eventual rejection of the concept of “good faith” as a separate fiduciary duty). Initially, Delaware’s 
creation of a separate “good faith” duty was an empty vessel into which plaintiffs sought to fit various 
forms of negligent behavior in order to avoid an exculpatory-charter provision authorized by DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010). By describing more precisely specific grounds for liability, MBCA 
section 8.31 appears to cabin the concept of “good faith.” That is, a director’s receipt of an improper 
financial benefit might logically be described as an act not in good faith, or one that was not in the best 
interests of the corporation, but the assertion of those grounds adds nothing to the director’s liability 
specified in section 8.31(a)(2)(v) for receipt of an improper financial benefit. 
 25. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(a)–(c) (2008). This preserves the traditional distinction 
between care and loyalty violations regarding placement of the burden of proof, and rejects the current 
Delaware rule in care cases that imposes the burden of proving entire fairness on the defendant if the 
plaintiff overcomes the business judgment rule in the complaint. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
634 A.2d 345, 361, 371 (Del. 1993). 
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B.  Use of Rules in the MBCA 
1.  Director Liability-Limiting Provisions 
The director liability-limiting provisions of Delaware law and the MBCA 
illustrate the difference between rules- and standards-based approaches to 
director liability. Both statutes authorize the adoption of a charter amendment 
limiting, or eliminating, the liability of directors in suits brought by or on behalf 
of the corporation. The provisions differ, however, in defining the types of 
director liability that cannot be limited or eliminated. The MBCA’s exceptions 
are limited to (1) the amount of a financial benefit to which the director was not 
entitled, (2) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation, (3) liabilities in 
connection with an unlawful dividend, and (4) an intentional violation of 
criminal law.26 The factual findings necessary to determine whether challenged 
conduct falls within one of these exceptions are both limited in number and 
fairly easily established. The Delaware provision also permits liability for an 
excessive dividend, receipt of a financial benefit, and intentional misconduct or 
violation of law (apparently civil or criminal), but would further allow liability 
for breach of the duty of loyalty and acts or omissions not in good faith.27 
Breach of loyalty is not defined, but is obviously meant to extend beyond self-
dealing since receipt of an improper financial benefit is listed as a separate 
ground. The exception for “good faith” also invites exploration of its outer 
boundaries. That is just what happened in Delaware: After the Delaware 
Supreme Court declared in 1993 that “good faith” was a separate fiduciary duty 
of equal rank with care and loyalty,28 plaintiffs tried to escape charter 
exculpatory provisions by characterizing claimed oversight failures as violations 
of the duty of good faith.29 It was not until thirteen years later that the Delaware 
Supreme Court put an end to this maneuver by demoting good faith to a 
component of the duty of loyalty and limiting its application in oversight cases 
to instances in which the board of directors intentionally fails to discharge its 
duties.30 
The MBCA chose a rule-based approach in recognition of the importance of 
clarifying the permissible scope of liability-limiting charter provisions: 
As important as validating the shareholders’ right to determine for themselves the 
extent of the directors’ liability is stating the limits of this right in terms of promoting a 
 
 26. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008). 
 27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010). 
 28. Cede, 634 A.2d at 361. 
 29. These were generally known as “Caremark claims” and based upon dicta by Chancellor Allen 
in approving a settlement in In re Caremark International Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967, 969–70 (Del. 
Ch. 1996). Earlier, Chancellor Allen had foreclosed characterizations of negligent behavior as a lack of 
good faith. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1141–42 (Del. Ch. 1994). 
 30. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (2006). Stone may not be the last word, however, as 
plaintiffs have continued to try (albeit unsuccessfully) to characterize other forms of behavior as good-
faith violations. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242–44 (Del. 2008) (rejecting a 
claim that the alleged failure to discharge adequately Revlon duties constituted bad faith). 
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clear understanding of the conduct which is and which is not included in the limitation 
of liability. Terms such as “duty of loyalty,” “good faith,” “bad faith,” and 
“recklessness” seem no more precise than (and potentially as expansive as) “gross 
negligence.” All of these formulations are characterizations of conduct rather than 
definitions of it. Characterizations by nature tend to be more elastic than definitions.31 
2.  Sales of Assets 
Standards seem an especially inappropriate way to provide the statutory 
procedures necessary for corporate combinations. Accordingly, statutes 
straightforwardly describe the types of combinations that are possible under the 
statute (mergers—straight or triangular, long or short form—and, under the 
MBCA, share exchanges) and then list the necessary steps, including who is 
entitled to vote on the combination, what percentage of votes is required, what 
documents must be filed, and the like. One would not expect a statute to 
declare that a plan of merger must receive a “reasonable” number of votes to be 
approved. 
Yet something uncomfortably close to establishment of such a standard has 
occurred with respect to the sale of assets: Whether shareholder approval is 
required and, at least in some states, whether appraisal is available turn on 
whether the proposed sale amounts to “substantially” all of the corporation’s 
assets.32 Clearly, a statute providing for shareholder approval only if all of the 
assets were sold would invite game playing, such as withholding a trivial amount 
of assets to avoid a shareholder vote; but it is not obvious why the legislature 
could not have provided that the sale of some specified percentage of the assets 
would require shareholder approval. Even so, one can imagine courts would 
have eventually distinguished between transactions requiring shareholder 
approval and those requiring only board action by developing at least rough 
guidelines based on the value of the assets sold. One could imagine such a 
development, that is, if the Delaware courts had not added a “qualitative” 
standard to the quantitative test implied by the statute. According to the test 
established in Gimbel v. Signal Cos.,33 shareholder approval is required if the 
sale “is out of the ordinary and substantially affects the existence and purpose 
of the corporation.”34 The word “existence” seems related to quantity, but 
“purpose” invites the court to make its own assessment of the sale’s effect on 
the corporation’s future business plans, and perhaps to substitute its own 
judgment for that of the corporation’s board of directors.35 The statutory 
purpose is to distinguish sales of assets that represent a fundamental change in 
 
 31. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 3.I (2008). 
 32. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2010). 
 33. Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 (Del 1974). 
 34. Id. at 606. 
 35. For example, in Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981), the court considered 
relevant to the qualitative test the fact that the manufacture of a company’s principal product, 
industrial drums, would be switched from steel to plastic after disposition of the assets in question. 
Normally, the choice of products to be manufactured by a corporation is clearly a decision for the 
board. 
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the nature of the shareholders’ investment, which require shareholder approval, 
from sales that are in the ordinary course of business, which the board may 
approve.36 The “qualitative” test can thus be seen as directed to the magnitude 
of the resulting change in the shareholders’ investment, but it is too open-ended 
to limit the types of facts that might be deemed relevant ex post, thereby 
decreasing predictability and encouraging challenges to sales transactions.37 
This is an instance in which a rule seems inarguably superior, and section 
12.02 of the MBCA adopts that approach. A sale, lease, or other disposition of 
assets requires shareholder approval if it would leave the corporation “without 
a significant continuing business.” The determination whether the corporation 
retains a “significant continuing business” requires a minimum amount of fact 
finding, especially since the section also provides an arithmetical safe harbor: If 
the retained business activity accounts for at least (1) twenty-five percent of 
total assets and (2) twenty-five percent of either income before taxes or revenue 
from continuing operations,38 the corporation will be conclusively deemed to 
have retained a significant continuing business and shareholder approval will 
not be required. 
3.  Appraisal Remedies 
Ironically, the most innovative and potentially most significant change is 
likely to result from the MBCA’s adoption of a rule-based approach to one of 
the least economically important provisions in corporation law: the appraisal 
remedy as applied to publicly traded corporations. Although relatively few 
shares are presented for appraisal in mergers or similar transactions, there is no 
obvious reason why it should be available at all in the case of publicly traded 
shares.39 Certainly courts have not been able to agree on a rationale. 
Historically, appraisal was a substitute for the common-law right of a single 
share to veto a merger transaction,40 and this notion, now long abandoned, 
 
 36. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.01 (2008) (listing dispositions of assets that do not require 
shareholder approval). 
 37. In Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004), the plaintiff 
challenged a sale of one of several newspaper groups on the grounds that the group to be sold included 
the London Daily Telegraph. Even though the sale would leave the corporation with sizable assets 
representing other newspapers, the plaintiff argued that great weight should be placed “on the greater 
journalistic reputation of the Telegraph when compared to the [Chicago] Sun Times, and the social 
importance of that newspaper in British life. . . . [A]fter the Telegraph sale, International’s name will 
even ring hollow, as it will own . . . only one paper of topflight journalistic reputation, the Jerusalem 
Post . . . .” Id. at 349, 384. Although the argument did not succeed, it was not completely preposterous 
to claim it was relevant to the qualitative test. 
 38. Income and revenue include all assets of the corporation and its subsidiaries, on a consolidated 
basis, for the most recent fiscal year for the purposes of this analysis. 
 39. Appraisal may be justified for fundamental changes in the case of smaller firms without a 
public market because there is no independent, market-determined benchmark of value, and because 
the shareholder seeking appraisal may have been an active participant in the business and thus in 
possession of information relevant to firm value. 
 40. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Takeout Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 624, 626–29 (1981). 
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continues to influence the view of appraisal as a compensatory remedy. 
According to this view, the purpose of appraisal is to compensate the dissenting 
shareholder from the loss of the shareholder’s proportional share of the 
corporation’s “going concern value.”41 But what does this mean? The only way 
to monetize a business’s going-concern value is to sell it, which, of course, is the 
very transaction to which the dissenter is objecting. A literally-minded person 
might conclude that the dissenting shareholder is essentially claiming the 
merged corporation was sold for less than its fair value, which makes sense but 
is not what the courts mean. Indeed, although some Delaware decisions have 
urged that a merger price produced by arm’s-length negotiation be given great 
weight in appraising fair value,42 the courts insist that a fair merger price is not 
necessarily the same thing as appraised fair value,43 which must therefore take 
into account other factors. Those “other factors” have sometimes produced 
appraisal awards of two to three times the merger consideration, thereby 
turning appraisal into something of a lottery.44 
In fairness to the courts, they have been saddled with trying to give content 
to a statutory standard that is almost completely devoid of any hint of what the 
statute is intended to achieve. Thus, courts have been left to their own devices 
to explain what is to be appraised and why. But compensatory explanations 
unravel when the Delaware “market out” is taken into account.45 In Delaware, 
the market-out exemption from appraisal is available only when shareholders of 
the merged firm receive publicly traded shares rather than cash. This distinction 
is not explainable on any rational economic ground. Obviously, cash is easier to 
value than stock, and stock consideration is neither more nor less likely than 
cash to compensate shareholders fairly. Nor can the distinction be explained on 
some imagined shareholder preference for one form of consideration over 
another. Since the market-out is available only if both parties are publicly 
traded, any shareholder who wants to retain an interest in the merged entity can 
easily do so by using the cash received for her shares to buy shares in the 
survivor, just as a shareholder who is paid in shares but does not want to 
continue as a shareholder can easily convert his shares to cash. 
 
 41. E.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142, 1145 (Del. 1989); Tri-Continental 
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 76 (Del. 1950). 
 42. E.g., Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 52–59 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 43. See, e.g., M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d. 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (“A fair merger price in 
the context of a breach of fiduciary duty claim will not always be a fair value in the context of 
determining going concern value.”). 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 792–94; Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 798, 800, 805, 809 (Del. 
1992). See generally William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Non-Existent: The 
Delaware Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 846–47 (2003). In a 
collection of short essays published in the Delaware Lawyer to commemorate the fortieth anniversary 
of the 1967 revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, all three essays on Delaware appraisal 
were highly critical. Michael P. Dooley, Rethinking Appraisal, 26 DEL. LAW. 28, 28 (2008); Stuart M. 
Grant & Michael J. Barry, Delaware’s Appraisal Statute: A Relic in Need of Reform, 26 DEL. LAW. 29, 
29 (2008); James C. Morphy, Doing Away with Appraisal in Public Deals, 26 DEL. LAW. 30, 30 (2008). 
 45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2010). 
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Perhaps influenced by the appraisal statute, Delaware courts have carried 
over the cash–share distinction to the duties of the board of directors when 
selling the corporation. According to what has become known as the Revlon 
rule, if a transaction will result in a change of control of the selling corporation, 
its board of directors must devote themselves to obtaining for the shareholders 
the highest value reasonably available.46 Since a sale of the corporation for cash 
will necessarily result in a change of control, the board cannot be content with 
negotiating a “good” or a “reasonable” price, but it must seek to obtain the 
“highest value” reasonably available, and its efforts in selecting and negotiating 
with a merger partner will be subject to special and more intrusive judicial 
scrutiny.47 One explanation offered for the special concern for change-of-control 
transactions is that this is the last chance for sellers to receive a “control 
premium” for their shares.48 Of course, that is true of anyone who sells anything: 
Not even Max Bialystock could succeed in trying to sell the same thing over and 
over again. Moreover, this justification does not explain the special concern for 
the seller’s shareholders. If the seller’s board has a duty to sell at the highest 
price, the buyer’s board has a duty to pay the lowest price. That, of course, is 
true of all negotiations between buyers and sellers. In all other instances, the 
price reached by the bargainers in an arm’s-length negotiation is the best 
evidence of a fair price, and the bargain will not be disturbed or second-guessed 
by courts, in the absence of fraud, conflicted interest, or other factors infecting 
the bargaining process. Some change-of-control transactions may present 
conflicts of interest,49 but the existence of the conflict should prompt concern, 
not the change of control—and certainly not the type of consideration used. A 
sale of the corporation for cash, negotiated at arm’s length, is not the same as an 
endgame where the buyer stands on both sides of the transaction and has the 
power to influence the seller’s board in its favor.50 Nor is it the same as a sale, 
whether for shares or cash, where the loyalty of the seller’s directors may have 
been compromised by side payments from the buyer. 
Although it may be too much to attribute the courts’ struggles with these 
issues to a lack of clarity in the appraisal statute, a rule-based approach to 
appraisal can sort these issues more logically. In sharp contrast to Delaware, the 
MBCA specifies what is to be valued and how: the “fair value” of the 
corporation is determined with reference to similar businesses in similar 
transactions.51 The MBCA directly confronts the conflicted-interest problem by 
 
 46. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 184 n.16 (Del. 1986). 
 47. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1989); Hanson Trust 
PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277–78, 280–81 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 48. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43 (Del. 1994). 
 49. This is true of Revlon itself, but later decisions do not remark upon the rule’s conflicted-interest 
origins. 
 50. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
 51. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (2008). In contrast to the traditional view of appraisal 
identifying a single fair value, the MBCA recognizes that “[m]odern valuation methods will normally 
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making both the availability of the market-out exemption and the scope of 
remedies turn on whether the transaction is a “conflicted interest transaction” 
as defined in the MBCA.52 Even so, the conflict can be cured by subjecting the 
transaction to approval by qualified directors and by shareholders in the same 
manner as provided in subchapter F for a director’s conflicted-interest 
transaction.53 The latter procedures would do much to limit what has become 
one of the most productive sources of shareholder suits.54 
III 
CONCLUSION 
Bayless Manning once famously described corporation statutes as “towering 
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing 
but wind.”55 While that is more than a bit harsh, it does recognize a central truth 
that has been largely ignored: The great bulk of corporation law in the United 
States has been created by courts, not legislatures. While courts must always 
play an important role in shaping the law on a case-by-case basis in many 
instances, it does not follow that all issues must be decided by litigation. There 
is much to be gained—in predictability, efficiency, and conservation of judicial 
resources—from stating at least some important rules upfront. In that regard, 




result in a range of values, not a particular single value. When a transaction falls within that range, ‘fair 
value’ has been established.” Id. § 13.01(4) cmt. 2. 
 52. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.01(5.1), 13.02(b)(4), 13.40(b)(3) (2008). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Indeed, three distinguished Delaware jurists have urged the adoption of an approach similar to 
the MBCA provisions. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo F. Strine Jr., Function over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1307 & n.81 
(2001). 
 55. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE 
L.J. 223, 245 & n.37 (1962). 
